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BETWEEN FORMALISM AND DISCRETION:
MEASURING TRENDS IN SUPREME COURT
RHETORIC
Michal Alberstein*
Limor Gabay-Egozi**
Bryna Bogoch***
This is the first study to use an empirical quantitative analysis to
determine the nature offormalism in court decisions. Our analysis has
revealed the complex interplay between different types offormalism in
Supreme Court of Israel decisions andprovides a new way of addressing
a jurisprudential issue that has been debated by legal scholars
for centuries.
The aspiration for formality is an integral element of judicial
decision writing. Judges are expected to decide cases based on rules, with
limited discretion and choice, using professional, dispassionate, and
impersonallanguage. At the same time, deviationfrom formalism, which
reflects personal expression and acknowledges the complexity of legal
cases, has also appearedin judicialrhetoric.
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is widely accepted that the aspiration for formality is an integral
element of judicial decision writing. Despite ongoing debates in legal
literature about the limits of formalism and challenges to the assumption
that legal cases can be decided by an objective, straightforward
application of rules, there still remains a commitment to the basic view of
law as a complete, autonomous, conceptually ordered, and socially
acceptable system.'
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1.

wILLIAM HALTOM, REPORTING ON THE COURTS: HOW THE MASS MEDIA COVER JUDICIAL

ACTIONS 8-9, 39, 48, 58-59 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, Forms ofFormalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607,
608-09 (1999).
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There have been numerous definitions of legal formalism suggested
in the literature, often incorporating different approaches to formalism. 2
Some refer to the inherent quality of law as based on formality in all its
institutional manifestations.3 Others condemn both the notion of
mechanical jurisprudence and the strict application of rules as rigid and
unsophisticated. 4 Discussions about the nature of formalism have often
concluded with normative arguments to follow rules 5 and to consider
policies and principles, as well as some calls to empirically test whether
there are benefits to the use of more flexible considerations or to the
reliance on rigid rules.
While traditional analyses of legal formalism have largely relied on
jurisprudential reasoning and have promoted a specific stance regarding
formalism, 8 in this Article we adopt an interdisciplinary empirical
approach, which aims to provide a new slant on the debate about
formalism by presenting a quantitative textual analysis of opinions in
randomly selected routine legal cases of the Israeli Supreme Court from
1948 to 2013. Inspired by law and literature studies' and based on the
issues raised by legal realists in the debate about formalism,' 0 we
developed a complex measure to depict the realization of formalism
within the rhetoric of Israeli Supreme Court opinions over time.
The Israeli legal system provides a unique case study as it combines
a British common law regime with some civil law influences. Moreover,
in the past decade, Israeli legal practice and academic writing has been
heavily influenced by American jurisprudence, including the
incorporation of notions of judicial review." Within this rich and diverse
legal culture, we expected to find various manifestations of different types
2.

Pildes, supra note 1, at 608-09, 612-13, 617.

3.

Robert S. Summers, How Law Is Formal and Why It Matters, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1165,

1196-97 (1997).
4. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 124-26 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 1-2, 4 (1977).
5. Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin "': Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U.

CHI. L. REv. 530, 561 (1999).
6.

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, at 4-5.

7. Cass R. Sunstein, Must FormalismBe Defended Empirically?,66 U. CHI. L. REv. 636, 667,
669-70 (1999).
8. Pildes, supra note 1, at 608, 610-11, 614, 618.
9. John Hollander, Legal Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE
LAW 176, 176-86 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric,

Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Culturaland Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 696-97 (1985);
see infra notes 48-53 and accompanying discussion.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 16-2 1.
11. MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 36-39, 54, 57, 58 (2011);
Aharon Barak, Some Reflections on the IsraeliLegal System and Its Judiciary,ELECTRONIC J. COMP.

L. (2002), http://www.ejcl.org/61/art6l-1.html.
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of legal formalism. While our analysis is based on Israeli judicial
decisions12-and thus the particular trajectories of formalism that we
found may reflect specific socio-legal events that occurred in Israel-the
empirical measurements we constructed to explore the realization of
formalism in judges' decision-making can certainly be applied to
decisions in other jurisdictions and legal systems. In fact, we anticipate
that the Israeli case findings and insights will be of benefit to socio-legal
scholars everywhere.
A.

The Claims and CounterclaimsofFormalisms ofLaw

Many of the arguments about formalism stem from Max Weber's
portrayal of modem law as a gapless system of rules.' 3 According to
Weber, one of the most advanced categories of legal thought in Western
society is "logical rationality" in which legal rules can be applied to any
concrete situation and be used to evaluate any social conduct.14
Jurisprudential scholarship, nevertheless, has challenged the possibility of
a gapless system and has pointed to gaps and ambiguities that exist in legal
rules that are particularly evident in hard cases.' 5 The Legal Realist
movement, which was part of the general intellectual revolt against
formalism in the United States, 16 was even more radical. Its proponents
claimed that rule-formalism was basically impossible." They maintained
that the indeterminacy of legal rules was pervasive, and thus judges
constantly made arbitrary decisions." Instead of a formalistic system, they
described a legal universe composed of policies and instrumental
19
reasoning, in which legal discretion was the norm and not the exception.
The Realists also pointed to the biased nature of fact-finding in legal
decision-making, claiming that norm-application was embedded in the
descriptions of facts, and they raised doubts about the claim that legal

See infra text accompanying notes 75-76.
MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 62 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils

&

12.
13.

Max Rheinstein trans., 1954).
14. Id. at 63-64.
15.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 272-74 (2d ed. 1994); Alexander, supra note 5, at

554-55.
16.

Morton G. White, The Revolt Against Formalism in American Social Thought of the

Twentieth Century, 8 J. HIST. IDEAS 131, 136-37 (1947).
17. Id.; Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of the "Formalist"Age 64 (St. John's Univ. Sch. of
2007),
06-0073,
No.
Paper
Series,
Paper
Research
Studies
Legal
Law
http://ssrn.com/abstract-985083.
18. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS
IN JUDGING 160, 171 (2010); Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, in AMERICAN LEGAL

REALISM 205, 208 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993); Tamanaha, supra note 17, at 64.
19.

TAMANAHA, supra note 18, at 160, 171.
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concepts had internal meaning. 2 0 They further described the significant
discrepancy that existed between law in the books and law in action.2 1
Following the realist critique, various reconstructions of the notion
of formalism have been developed. Some scholars have described the
formality of the legal universe as entailing principles, policies, and moral
considerations. 22 Others have redefined the notion of judicial discretion,
so that it is now limited and refers to structured reasoning rather than
open-ended choice-making. 23 These new "forms of formalism" reflect the
multiplicity of views regarding the formalism of law that often are
realized within the texts of legal decisions.24
The various claims and counterclaims about formalism that have
been developed and discussed in legal literature and academic debates can
be categorized into ten constructs of formalism. 25
1. The Introduction and Framing of the Legal Decision
Within a formalistic legal culture, the question of formal authority
for the decision and the legal framing of the dispute receive paramount
attention. From the outset, the issue to be decided is framed as a legal
question. Judges present themselves as deciding according to the law and
often preface their decision by referring to the formal basis of their
judgment.2 6 Questions of standing are meticulously argued, and
procedural concerns are emphasized. Modern critique, however, has
challenged the notion that all legal conflicts can or should be framed as
legal questions.2 7 In addition, modern critique has marginalized
formalistic questions of jurisdiction and of standing in certain legal
contexts in favor of reference to the merits of the legal claim. 28 Thus, if
the opinion opens with the legal question, if the issue at stake is defined
from the outset as a matter of applying legal norms to existing facts, and
if questions of jurisdiction are raised at the beginning of the opinion, the
opening would be regarded as formalistic.

20.

JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 30 (spec. ed., The Legal Classics Library

1985) (1930).
21. Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 611-12 (1908).
22.

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, at 3.

23. Pildes, supra note 1, at 616-17.
24. Id. at 607-09.
25. See Michal Alberstein, Measuring Legal Formalism: Reading Hard Cases with Soft
Frames, in 57 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 161, 176-78 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012); see
infra text accompanying notes 26-64.
26. Alberstein, supra note 25, at 181.

27. Id. at 181-83.
28. Id at 182.
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2. Reliance on Extra-legal Arguments
Classic descriptions of the modem Western legal system have
assumed that there is a separation of the legal realm from other social
institutions, such that decisions in the legal sphere are made and rules
understood according to abstract principles that are applied to the
determination of specific cases. 2 9 Thus, law is considered a closed system
in which there is no reference to external considerations, such as political,
sociological, or economic issues. Indeed, formalism envisions the
operation of the legal system as a separate technical and rational machine.
In contrast, the Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies schools of law
have pointed to political and ideological considerations that determine
legal decisions and have noted the insertion of personal, political, and
focus on factors
ideological elements into judicial decision writing.30 T
are considered
arguments
of
external
use
the
and
field
outside the legal
inherently anti-formalistic, and many of the claims against the
"politicization of the judiciary" have been based on the move away from
31
Indeed,
formalism that relies on these extra-legal rationales.
to the
accorded
legitimacy
the
that
indicates
experimental evidence
rationales
extra-legal
Supreme Courts is damaged to a certain extent when
are used.3 2 This Article examines the tendency to rely on extra-legal
factors in routine cases, in order to determine whether there is a move
away from formalism over time.
3. Reliance on Policy Arguments and Legal Principles
Another corollary of the view of law as a closed, unified rational
system is that judges apply legal norms without reference to policy
arguments or legal or moral principles. Any appeal to policy
considerations or to unwritten principles of the law is considered a
deviation from formalism. Rejecting this claim, a large body of writing
maintains that legal decisions are based on social goals, policy
considerations, and legal principles, which do not necessarily correspond
to the definition of a rule, yet are also not considered political or external
to the legal field.3 3 The Legal Process school of law developed a
29.
30.

MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 13, at 63-64.
Alberstein, supra note 25, at 183-84 (noting cases where judges have utilized either

personal, political, or ideological elements as a basis for their judicial decisions).
31. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the InterpretationofStatutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 194 (1986). In the United States, such claims were

raised within famous precedential cases such as Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000); Brown v. Bd.
ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 492-94 (1954); and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59-60 (1905).
32.

Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme Court

Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 206, 213 (2012).
33.

Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: ConstitutionalStare Decisis, Legal

Formalism, and the Future of UnenumeratedRights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 201, 204-06 (2006).
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reconstructed version of formalism in law that relies on policies and
principles in what is known as "purposive interpretation." 3 4 Ronald
Dworkin further developed the argument that discretion in hard cases is
narrow because judges are bound by the principles and policies that are
inherent components of legal norms.35 Our empirical analysis will enable
us to determine whether there was a move away from rule-based
formalism to policy-based decision making over time.
4. Impartiality and Impersonality
Another characteristic of formalism is the use of impersonal
language to create the impression that judges speak the law as direct
delegates of the legislator and that there is "a government of laws, not
men." 36 In contrast to this view, some scholars have discussed judges'
need to express themselves in personal and emotional terms3 7 and have
pointed to the expression of emotions,3 as well as judicial biases and
huncheS 39 in legal decisions. Those who object to expressions of emotion
and personal style claim that these challenge judges' assumed detachment
and impersonal reasoning. 40 Thus, formalism in judicial opinions would
be associated with the lack of personal expressions by judges, whereas the
move away from formalism would be seen in decisions that include
references to the judge's own thoughts and feelings.

'

5. Judicial Discretion and Choice
According to a formalist perspective, the application of legal rules is
done in a mechanical manner, without exercising discretion or choice. 4
Formal legal writing ignores doubts and covers gaps with sub-rules and
procedures. In a formal legal system, judges present the law as
34. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 102, 104, 106 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., Foundation Press 1994) (tent. ed. 1958).
35. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 124-25; Ronald Dworkin, Judicial Discretion,
60 J. PHIL. 624, 634-35 (1963).
36. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 122-26 (2004);
Lorenz Kaehler, First-PersonPerspectives in Legal Decisions, in 15 LANGUAGE AND LAW: CURRENT
LEGAL ISSUES 2011, at 533, 548-51 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013).
37. Terry A. Maroney & James J. Gross, The Ideal of the DispassionateJudge: An Emotion
Regulation Perspective, 6 EMOTION REV. 142, 144 (2014).
38. Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Magistrates'Everyday Work andEmotional Labour,
32 J.L. & SOC'Y 590, 601-03, 614 (2005).
39. Frank, supra note 18, at 208.
40. However, Popkin has suggested that today U.S. judges who use a personal/exploratory style
are more, rather than less, likely to accommodate the twin political goals of projecting judicial
authority and performing the difficult professional task of deciding cases .....
See WILLIAM D.
POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES 5 (2007).
41. RICHARD. A POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 241-42 (1999).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss4/2
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determining the decision, as if there is one true resolution to the legal
problem, and rarely allow for expressions of doubt or self-reflection in the
decision.4 2 In contrast to this view, critics claim that discretion is
inevitable in any decision-making and that judges' work involves a
substantial degree of intuition, with many junctures where choice is
exercised.4 3 Thus, the acknowledgement of options, and personal
reflection on the choices made, would characterize non-formalistic
decisions, as would contemplation of difficulties or doubts in the decisionmaking process.
6. The Relationship Between Facts and Norms
Another tenet of formalism is that judges apply legal norms to facts
that have been determined objectively. Many legal disputes are about
facts, and judges are considered professional factfinders who use the laws
of evidence to distinguish fiction from truth in a definitive way. In a
formal system, there is a clear separation between the determination of
facts and the application of norms. Judges perceive themselves as
professionals who are capable of overcoming any potential biases and
who have the ability to differentiate between real justice and the
appearance of justice." Critics of formalism maintain that the legal
determination of facts is biased and is influenced by a variety of factors,
including the setting, and the emotional and cultural background of the
judges.4 5 Contrary to the formalistic assumption that facts are first
determined and described, while norms are later applied, critics claim that
norm application is embedded in the descriptions of the facts, and
therefore a non-judgmental determination of facts does not exist.4 6
Following this critique, contemporary scholars of law and literature have
pointed to the close connection between storytelling and fact-finding and
the importance of narrative theory in understanding the way courts decide
facts.47 Thus, a formalistic decision would present the facts of the case as
external to and independent of the judgmental act, while in a non-formalist
decision, the judge will include emotions and evaluative comments while
presenting the facts.
42.
43.

Id.
Warren Lehman, Rules in Law, 72 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1574-75 (1984). Lehman argues in favor

of an intuition-based approach to decision-making in law that counters the critique of formalism by

Legal Realism. Id. at 1586, 1595.
44. See generally Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Are Judges Human? The Construction of the Image of
the ProfessionalJudge in Light ofJudicialDisqualificationRules, 8 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 49 (2005)
(in Hebrew).

45. FRANK, supra note 20, at 120-21, 126, 128.
46. Id.
47. See generally Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORIES:
NARRATIvE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 9, at 14, 14-22.
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7. Professional Legal Rhetoric
Formalism is related to the use of professional language. "Legal
language" refers to more than any particular practice and assumption of
the law. It includes the use of legal terminology, special syntax, the
avoidance of emotional and everyday language expressions, and the
application of legal reasoning that is associated with a specific sequential
structure.4 8 The use of professional language also defines the boundaries
of legal practice and produces legitimacy and acceptability. 49 However, as
critics have pointed out, judges regularly deviate from professional
language.5 0 They may quote poetry or literary texts;" they may adopt
elements and stylistic devices from other registers, and even include
humor in their decisions.52 The use of professional language that is often
inaccessible to laypersons is a basic feature of legal formalism.53 Evidence
of the move away from formalism would be the inclusion of non-legal
registers in the decision, the use of poetry, expressions from popular
culture, or references to literature and art.
8. Institutional Boundaries
Part of the formalistic conception of law as a complete autonomous
system is the idea of preserving boundaries between the different
institutions in society and ensuring that the professional competence of
each branch of government is maintained without extensive interventions
by the judiciary.5 4 This principle also refers to the relationship between
instances of the same court, so that a judge will not intervene in a lower
court decision unless very specific types of errors have occurred. This
implies a conservative approach to judging. Scholars who have studied
judicial activism have emphasized the role of courts in influencing and
controlling other branches of governance and in promoting human rights

48. Brenda Danet, Language in the Legal Process, 14 L. & Soc'Y REV. 445, 474-84 (1980);
see Judith Turnbull, Expert to Lay Communication:Legal Information and Advice on the Internet, in
LANGUAGE AND LAW IN PROFESSIONAL DISCOURSE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 61, 65-68 (Vijay K.

Bhatia et al. eds., 2014).
49. Michael A. Livermore et al., The Supreme Court and the Judicial Genre, 59 ARIZ. L. REV.
837, 851-52 (2017).
50. Id. at 883, 887.
51. Mary Kate Kearney, The Propriety of Poetry in Judicial Opinions, 12 WIDENER L.J. 597,
601-06 (2003).
52. Marshall Rudolph, Note, JudicialHumor:A LaughingMatter?, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 17879 (1989); Susan K. Rushing, Student Essay, Is Judicial Humor Judicious?, 1 SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING 125, 125-26 (1990).
53.

See Ryan J. Owens et al., How the Supreme Court Alters Opinion Language to Evade

CongressionalReview, 1 J.L. & CTS. 35, 38 (2013) (suggesting that Justices strategically obfuscate
the language of their decisions in order to evade congressional review).
54.

HART & SACKS, supra note 34, at 163-67.
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values.ss Thus, we suggest that judges who intervene in the decisions of
other institutions would be regarded as non-formalistic. In cases of the
civil and criminal appeals that we examined, there is always a question of
intervention in the decision of the previous instance. In constitutional and
public cases, High Court of Justice ("HCJ")5 6 intervention is debated in
reference to the administrative or executive branch or other professional
courts." We assume that over time there will be less rhetoric of
maintaining institutional boundaries and more actual intervention, and
therefore, less formalism.
9. Rationalism and the Inner Logic of Legal Spheres
According to formalism, the basic quality of law as a system of
norms is related to the deductive relations between principles and rules,
as well as to the horizontal differentiations among the various fields of the
law. Law is a logical system in which coherence and systematization are
of paramount importance, and each field of law is characterized by unique
and distinct rules.58 The counter-argument to the above assumption is that
the boundaries of the law are flexible and given to new demarcations in
accordance with the needs and problems that arise. According to this
parameter, deviation from formalism will occur when an explicit
declaration is made regarding the innovation or boundaries-blurring role
of the decision.
10. The Gap Between "Law in the Books" and "Law in Action"
In formalistic thinking, there is an assumption that the statement and
application of a norm will produce changes in reality, and that "law in the

55. Kenneth M. Holland, Introduction, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
1, 3 (Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991); Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of

"JudicialActivism ", 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1441, 1451 (2004); Marvin Schick, JudicialActivism on the
&

Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 37, 37-38 (Stephen C. Halpern

Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982); J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic
Society-JudicialActivismor Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (1968); J. Clifford Wallace, The
JurisprudenceofJudicialRestraint:A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1982)
(cautioning against judicial activism).

56. The Israeli Supreme Court functions both as the final instance appellate court in all civil
and criminal cases, and as the first and last instance in its role as the HCJ. Plaintiffs can petition the
HCJ directly to seek relief from administrative decisions of public agencies, without going through
other instances.
57. See Gary J. Jacobsohn, JudicialActivism in Israel, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 55, at 90, 96-98.
58. Paul N. Cox, An Interpretationand(Partial)Defense ofLegal Formalism,36 IND. L. REV.

57, 68 (2003) ("Rules enable those subject to them to predict the legal effect of their behavior and
therefore enable coordination; rules preclude discretion and enable a claim that we are governed by
law, not men; rules ensure that law is prospective, not retroactive.").
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books" corresponds to "law in action." 5 9 Here too, the claim is formalistic
in that it regards the rationality of law as a mechanism to control reality.
The counterclaim is that law in action is different from law in the books
and that legal writing has, at best, only an indirect connection to social
change. The origin of this critique goes back to the sociological
jurisprudence movement developed by Roscoe Pound,60 which criticized
legal studies for their emphasis on legal rules and decision-making, while
ignoring the social context and implications of those decisions. 6 1 Legal
Realists continued to challenge the overemphasis on norms and on court
opinions and have developed a positivist approach based on the empirical
analysis of the interaction between norms and reality.62 Scholars of law
and society have expanded this critique in academic debates and empirical
research about the ability of legal rules and decisions to produce social
change.6 3 In general, a formalistic judge takes the implementation of legal
norms for granted, without referring to the effect of the rules or the
difficulties of ensuring compliance with the decision, whereas
deliberation regarding these issues would be signs of non-formalism.
These ten constructs of formalism were operationalized as a code
used in the content analysis of 2086 judicial decisions of civil and criminal
appeals and public law cases. It thus joins the growing body of scholarly
research of legal decisions that use content analysis in order to provide a
more systematic and objective way to document what courts do and say
than conventional interpretive techniques.' It should be noted that this
study does not seek to develop or test a theory ofjudicial decision-making
or opinion writing. Rather, it strives to describe trends and generate
conjectures about the nature of legal rhetoric in Israeli Supreme Court
opinions and to stimulate questions about similar phenomena elsewhere.

59.
60.

Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 20 (1910).
Id. at 20-21; Pound, supra note 21, at 609-10.

61.
62.

ALAN HUNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW 14-15 (1978).
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 25

(1995); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1150 (1999)
(reviewing ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).
63. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? 9-10 (2d ed. 2008).
64. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 63, 70-71 (2008). Hall & Wright note that content analysis is particularly suitable in
cases that debunk conventional legal wisdom. Id. at 84. We sought to examine what has become
common opinion among Israeli legal scholars, i.e., that there has been a decline in formalism over
time. See infra Part I.B.
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The Israeli Debate about the Decline ofFormalism

The debate about formalism in Israeli legal culture emerged and
developed following a monograph written by Menahem Mautner in which
he described the "decline of formalism and the rise of values in Israeli
law." 6 5 This essay captured a broad shift in legal writing by the Israeli
Supreme Court during the 1980s, which included a greater emphasis on
values, on substance, and on judicial activism.6 6 The changes in legal
rhetoric, Mautner claimed, were part of an all-embracing shift from
collectivism to individualism reflected in other social and cultural
arenas. 6 7
Despite some criticism of Mautner's argument, 68 there is a broad
consensus among legal academics that Aharon Barak, the former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel, who is considered a particularly
"activist" and "anti-formalist" judge, had a significant impact on the
written opinions of Israeli judges. 6 9 Thus, the early period of the State is
commonly regarded as formalistic, guided by a strong libertarian spirit of
human rights protection. Both personality and socio-legal factors are
associated with a decline in formalism and a move to values in Israeli legal
decision writing in the eighties.7 ' The promotion of Justice Barak to the
Supreme Court of Israel in 1978, the Americanization of Israeli societywith legal actors looking to the United States, rather than Germany and
England-as models for decision writing, as well as the exposure of
Israeli academics to "law and" movements that promote the approaches
of Legal Realism, are all cited by Mautner as explanations for the decline
in formalism during that time.n

65.

MENAHEM MAUTNER, THE DECLINE OF FORMALISM AND THE RISE OF VALUES IN ISRAELI

LAW 503 (1993) (in Hebrew).
66. See id.
67. MAUTNER,supra note 11, at 113.
68. See generallyJ.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES (2d ed. 1997); Ariel L. Bendor, The Life
of Law Has Been Logic, andHence Everything is Justiciable: On Appropriate Legal Formalism, 6

MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 591, 591-596 (2003) (in Hebrew) (claiming that the legal formalism has
inherent important values which were undermined by Mautner); Daniel Friedman, Formalism and

Values- Legal CertaintyandJudicialActivism,21 HAMISHPAT 2, 2-3 (2007) (in Hebrew) (challenging
the negative association between formalism and values); Nir Kedar, The Educating Legal Formalism
of the Early Israeli Supreme Court, 22 BAR-ILAN LAW STUDIES 385 (2006) (in Hebrew) (claiming
that the use of legal formalism in the 1950s was part of the Court's effort to enhance liberal values);
But see Re'em Segev, Fairness,Responsibility andSelf-Defense, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 383, 392-

93 (2005).
69. Roei Amit, Constructionsof Canon: Barak's Texts as a Formative Canon, 21 TEL AVIV
LEGAL STUD. 81 (1998) (in Hebrew); Richard A. Posner, EnlightenedDespot, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr.
23, 2007), https://newrepublic.com/article/60919/enlightened-despot.
70. MAUTNER, supra note 11, at 54-56, 58.
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There are a number of reasons to assume that since the mid-nineties
there has been some return to formalism. Those who promote this view
argue that Mautner's claim about Justice Barak's influence and the
subsequent media debate about his judicial activism created a backlash
which in turn led to a more conservative, formalistic mode of decision
writing. 72

Our research examines these taken-for-granted assumptions about
the existence and timing of trends in formalism and seeks to define more
precisely the type of formalism that is said to have changed over time. In
this project, formalism is analyzed as a social construct comprised of
diverse jurisprudential cultures and claims, which are discussed below.
We rely on conceptions of formalism that include assumptions about factfinding, the relationship between legal decision-making and reality, the
level of discretion and creativity in decision-making, and the style of
judicial writing. Thus, we attempt to tease out the various dimensions of
legal formalism by an empirical analysis of a large number of judicial
decisions in public law and civil and criminal appeals. These elements are
examined against the expected trends in the timing and periods of legal
formalism discussed above: 1948-1979, 1980-1995, 1996-2007, and
2008-2013.74
II.

METHODOLOGY

Using data from the legal database Nevo,75 we examined changes in
formalism over time in Israeli Supreme Court cases. We identified our
population as all primary decisions marked "judicial opinions" and not
just technical decisions that were longer than two pages and were written
between the years 1948 and 2013. We based our sample strategy on the
distribution of decisions by the Supreme Court of Israel in each of its
functions as the final appellate court in civil and criminal cases and as the
HCJ over the years.76 From that pool of all judicial decisions, we sampled
every four years for three consecutive months each year in the early years
and two consecutive months each year from 1986 on. We began with a
different month each year.
72. Alberstein, supra note 25, at 189-90.
73. See infra Part III.
74. See supratext accompanying notes 65-72.
75. Nevo is regarded as the most complete commercial database of Israeli judicial opinions,
and it claims that it receives all of the judicial decisions directly from the Supreme Court of Israel.
76. In Israel, justices usually sit in a panel of three, although the Chief Justice can decide to add
as many justices as he/she deems necessary (that result in an odd number), and in rare sensitive cases,
all fifteen justices can decide. In general, there is a lead opinion for the majority, but there is no
"opinion of the Court" as such. Each of the justices on the panel can also add their own concurring or
dissenting opinions. Our sample included all of the decisions in each case.
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There were two reasons for oversampling in the earlier years. For
one, in the early years, selected decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court
were published by the Bar Association, based on the editors' assessments
of their importance and precedential nature. Only in 1985 did the Israeli
Supreme Court start computerizing all its decisions, and a few years later,
the Bar Association and commercial enterprises began producing CDbased and online full text decisions. Today, there are more than five
commercial databases that publish court decisions, and the most
comprehensive one, Nevo, has also added to current decisions the
opinions that were previously unpublished in print form. The problem is
that unless we go through court files, there is no way of knowing how
many of the early decisions were unpublished. In addition, there is a large
gap between the number of decisions made by the Israeli Supreme Court
in the early years compared to current numbers, and we wanted to have
less of an imbalance between the number of decisions in each time period.
Thus, our sample matches the proportion of decisions for each year and
each particular instance with the actual number decided by the Court
during each year and in the particular court function, slightly weighting
the early years. Altogether, there were 2086 opinions in our sample,
including 664 criminal, 849 civil and 573 public law (HCJ) cases.
In order to examine the claims about the changes in Israeli decision
writing over time we divided the research years into four periods of time:
1948-1979, 1980-1994, 1995-2006, and 2007-2013. This grouping was
chosen because, as previously noted, it reflected periods during which
there were changes in legislation, in the identity of the Justices of the
Supreme Court, and in public opinion and academic perceptions about the
Supreme Court.
Our analytical tool was a code of ten parameters that distinguished
between formalistic and non-formalistic rhetoric in judicial decision
writing in accordance with the claims and counterclaims of the opponents
and advocates of the formalism debate. A series of one to seven yes/no
questions were used to determine the formalism of each parameter, for a
total of thirty-one binary variables. 7 Apart from two questions (Var46
and Var47), all questions were coded as "0" if the particular phenomenon
referred to by the variable was not present in the decision and "1" if it
occurred. For purposes of analysis, we recoded the twenty-nine binary
variables so that "1" reflects the formalistic option (i.e., either the
presence or absence of the particular criterion). The coders were six
trained law students. To ensure correct coding and inter-coder reliability,
sixty decisions were coded by all coders in order to determine the
77.

See infra Table 1.
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reliability of the coding scheme and the clarity of the variables. The
Cohen's kappa test of reliability among the six coders ranged from 0.71
to 1.00, with an average of 0.825 across the coders and variables.
Table 1. Description of Variables Used in Content Analysis*
A.

The introductory frarning of the decision (refers to the first 2 pages of the decision)

(Var2l) Legal intro: Does the decision open with a legal question or issue?

Y

[If "yes" for Var21, go to Var22 and Var23:]
(Var22) Policy: Is the legal question presented as one of policy?

N

(Var23) Ideological: Is the legal issue presented as an ideological or value

N

choice issue?
(Var24) Non-legal sources: Does the decision open with a quote from external sources

N

(non-legal)?
(Var25) Facts-norms:Does the decision open with a presentation of the facts of the case?

Y

[If "yes" for Var25, go to Var26]
(Var26) Facts: Does the decision present the facts in the first paragraph of the

Y

decision?
(Var27) Authority: Does the decision open with a question of jurisdiction?
B.

Y

Reliance on extra-legal arguments

(Var28) Extra-legal: Does the decision refer to extra-legal research (i.e., economics,

N

sociology, etc.)?
(Var29) Cultural: Does the decision refer to common knowledge and cultural

N

understandings?
C,

Reliance on policy arguments and legal principles

(Var30) Purpose:Does the decision refer to the purpose of the relevant statute?

N

(Var3l) Principles: Does the decision present principles such as equality, freedom,

N

security, as inferred from legal texts?
(Var32) Balancing: Does the decision refer to the balancing of principles and/or rights?

N

(Var33) Policy: Is the decision presented as geared to the fulfillment of social purposes

N

or based on social policy considerations?
D.

Impartiality and impersonality

(Var34) First person: Does the decision explicitly mention personal reflection and

N

deliberation-e.g. "I think," "I believe," "in my opinion"?
E.

Judicial discretion and choice

(Var35) Difficulty: Is there reference to the difficulty in deciding the case?

N

(Var36) Discretion:Is the decision presented as a product of discretion (as opposed to the
product of logical/legal reasoning and/or necessity)

N

F.

The relationship between facts and norms

(Var37) Description offacts: Does the decision include a description of the facts of the

Y

case?
[if "yes" for var37, go to var38 and var39:]
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(Var38) Feelings of parties: Does the judge's description of the facts of the

N

case include a description of the feelings, attitudes, emotions of the parties?
(Var39) Facts,previous instance:Does the decision include a reference to the

Y

facts as presented by previous instances or other opinions?
(Var 40) Legal/Other Truth: Does the judge make a distinction between legal
truth and factual truth (legal facts and social/other facts)?
G.

N

Professional legal rhetoric

(Var4l) Personal experience: Does the decision include events from the judges' own

N

personal experience?
(Var42) Popular culture: Does the decision include references to literature, art, popular

N

culture, poetry, humor, etc.?
(Var43) Slang: Does the decision include slang or popular idioms?

N

(Var44) Poetic style: Does the language of the decision stylistically diverge from ordinary

N

legal writing?
Institutional boundaries
(Var45) Intervention:Does the court intervene in the decision/operation of
H.

N

other institutions?
[if "yes" for var45, go to var46 and var47:]
(Var46): Institution of intervention. Regarding which institution does the court
present itself as intervening?
Administrative branch
Legislative branch
Other professional courts (labor, rabbinic, military), lower courts
(Var47): Authority to intervene: Does the court determine that it has the
authority to intervene?
No, it determines that it does not have the authority to intervene
Yes, it determines that it has the authority, but will not intervene
Yes, it determines that it has the authority to intervene and does intervene
.

Rationalism and the inner logic of legal spheres
(Var48): Departure:Does the decision mention that it is a departure from

N

current legal norms and practice?
(Var49): Innovative: Does the decision mention that it is an innovative or

N

boundary breaking decision?
J.

Law in the books and law in action
(Var50): Implementation: Does the decision refer to the difficulty of

N

implementation?
(Var5l): Forwardedfor implementation: Is the decision forwarded to other

N

institutions for implementation?
(Var52): Overcoming implementation problems: Does the decision mention

N

ways of overcoming the hurdles that might prevent implementation?
*The formalistic option is indicated, Y=Yes, N=No
Note: The results presented below do not address variables 22, 23, and 26 in an attempt to
streamline the analysis because they did not contribute any added value to the discussion
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RESULTS

As mentioned previously, we expected that, in general, on each of
the parameters of formalism the first period (1948-1979) would be
marked by formalistic writing, the second (1980-1996) would reflect the
decline of formalism, while there would be a return to formalism in the
mid-nineties (1997-2007), and that would increase after the retirement of
Chief Justice Barak in 2006 (2008-2013). Tables 2-11 present the means
and standard deviations for each parameter of formalism in each of these
four periods of time with the formalistic option on each criterion scored
as "1".78 The means represent the proportion of all judges' opinions that
exhibited the formalistic option on each parameter during each period of
time. We employed a one-way analysis of variance ("ANOVA") test for
time differences in the formalism of each parameter. In addition to the Ftest, which indicates whether changes over the entire time period are
statistically significant, we also present a Bonferroni post hoc test to
isolate the particular years in which the differences between the means of
formalism are statistically significant.
A.

The IntroductoryFramingof the Legal Decision

Features of decision openings that indicate a move away from
formalism include: framing the issues to be decided as policy and value
matters, rather than as legal questions; ignoring questions of jurisdiction
in the introduction; not referring to the facts of the case in the opening;
and including references to sources external to the law at the beginning of
the decision. Table 2 reveals differences in both the extent of formalism
indicated by these variables and their trajectories over time. 79 From the
earliest period, about half the decisions opened formalistically by
presenting the decision as a legal question and continued to do so over
time (46% to 53%).80 The only exception was the period from 1980 to
1995, when the number of opinions that opened with a legal question
dropped to 27%.81 Even more decisions opened with a formalistic
reference to the facts of the case (from 76% to 86%), and there was a
significant increase in formalism over time on this variable. 8 2

78.
79.

See infra Tables 2-11.
See infra Table 2.

80.

See infra Table 2.

81.
82.

See infra Table 2.
See infra Table 2.
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Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Formalism in the Introduction of the Decisions over Time
A.

The IntroductoryFramingof the Legal Decision[Noles] b to Indicate Formalism
194S-79
1980-95
(n=71 I)
(n=-437)
(u=45 I
(n 487)

(Var2 1)

0.46***

0.27***

0.53

0.46

Does the decision open
with a legal question or
issue? [Yes]

(0.50)

(0.44)

(0.50)

(0.50)

24.23***

(Var24)

1.00

1.00

0.99

1.00

Does the decision open
with a quote from external
sources (non-legal)? [No]

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.08)

(0.05)

0.98

Does the decision open
with a presentation of the
facts of the case [Yes]

0.76**
(0.43)

0.84
(0.37)

0.82
(0.38)

0.86***
(0.35)

6.93***

(Var27)

0.15

0.19***

0.33*

0.42***

47.90***

Does the decision open
with
a
question
of
jurisdiction? [Yes]

(0.36)

(0.39)

(0.47)

(0.49)

(Var25)

*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001
Note: For Tables 2-11 asterisks in Column 2 (1948-79) indicate statistically significant differences
between the means shown in Columns 2 and 3 (1980-95). Asterisks in Column 3 indicate statistically
significant differences between the means shown in Columns 3 and 4 (1996-2007). Asterisks in
Column 4 indicate statistically significant differences between the means shown in Columns 4 and 5
(2008-13). Asterisks in Column 5 indicate statistically significant differences between the means
shown in Columns 5 and 2.

The results of the formalism of other variables on this parameter
were mixed. While hardly any opinions opened with a quote from nonlegal external sources, formalistic references to jurisdictional matters rose
from 15% of all opinions during 1948-1979 to 42% during 2008-2013.83
Still, most judges did not begin the opinion with jurisdictional matters,
which would have been a formalist way of framing the decision.
Overall we can see that while judges did not use the formalistic
options on all features of the opening of the decision, there was an increase
in the tendency to frame the decision formalistically over time. Although
precedential cases sometimes introduce legal cases in a non-formalistic
manner,8 4 in an empirical test of a random sample of cases, such framing
is not common.

83. See supra Table 2.
84. Alberstein, supranote 25, at 181-82.
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Reliance on Extra-legalArguments

Formalists regard law as a closed discourse, and judges are expected
to make decisions only in reference to this universe. Our findings suggest
that, notwithstanding Mautner's claims, legal decisions continue to rely
largely on legal arguments, without reference to other forms of
knowledge. Results in Table 3 indicate that overall there are no
statistically significant differences between the various periods of time in
the use of extra-legal arguments.8 6 One exception is the period of 19962007 in which we find a minor, but statistically significant, decline in the
proportion of decisions that did not rely on common knowledge compared
to the previous period (1980-1995), so that formalism declined from 96%
of all opinions to 90%.87 Nevertheless, on this parameter, formalism still
remains extremely high over time and the tendency to rely on knowledge
outside the legal sphere did not increase in the eighties, as Mautner
maintained.
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Formalism in the Reliance on Extra-legal Arguments over
Time

Reliance on extra-legal arguments [no/yes] to indicateformalism

B.

1948-79

1980-95

1996-07

2008-13

(n=71 1)

(n=437)

(n=451)

(n=487)

(Var28)

0.99

0.98

0.98

0.98

Does the decision refer to extra-

(0.07)

(0.14)

(0.15)

(0.15)

0.93

0.96**

0.90

0.92

(0.26)

(0.19)

(0.30)

(0.28)

F
5.58

legal research (i.e. economics,
sociology, etc.)? [No]
(Var29)
Does the

decision refer

common

knowledge

to

4.56**

and

cultural understandings? [No]

*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001

C. Reliance on Policy Arguments and on Legal Principles
Formalism is associated with decision-making based strictly on legal
norms, whereas the decline of formalism is related to outcomes that
pursue policy goals and are inspired by values and principles. It is on this
measure that we found the most significant decline in formalism over time
85.
86.
87.
88.

MAUTNER, supra note 11, at 36, 39-40, 54.
See infra Table 3.
See infra Table 3.
MAUTNER, supra note 11, at 90-96.
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and the greatest support for Mautner's thesis. 89 Here the transformation of
legal rhetoric in Israeli caselaw is clear: Rather than relying basically on
legal rules, there is now a significant use of the rhetoric of policy and
principles in legal decisions. Each of the variables on this parameter
indicates a move away from formalism when comparing the earliest and
current periods. 90 Judges are more likely to refer to the purpose of the
statute in their writings (9% of all opinions in 1948-1979 compared with
21% in recent years), 91 they are more likely to mention principles such as
"equality and freedom" (7% to 32%),92 and to refer to the balance between
principles and/or rights (17% to 36%).93 Moreover, judges were not only
more likely to cite social purposes and policies but to increasingly present
their decisions as founded on such sources (12% in the first period
compared to 36% in the most recent one).94 However, it should be noted
that despite the decline in formalism on this measure, on average about
64% to 93% of judges' decisions across time were based strictly on legal
norms. 95 Moreover, contrary to our expectation for a formalist revival

since the mid-nineties and after the retirement of Chief Justice Barak, the
decline in formalism is mainly attributed to the years of 1996-2007, with
no statistically significant change in the later years, 2008-2013.96 We
have added a figure that graphically represents these trends (Figure 1) and
offer an interpretation for these interesting patterns in the discussion. 97

89. Id. at 91.
90. See infra Table 4.
91. SeeinfraTable4.
92. See infra Table 4. The decision was coded as referring to principles when it did so without
clearly presenting these principles as a consequence of the two Basic Laws.
93. See infra Table 4.
94. See infra Table 4.
95. See infra Table 4.
96. See infra Table 4.
97. See infra Figurel & Part IV.
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Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations of Formalism in the Reliance on Policy Arguments and on
Legal Principles over Time
Reliance on PolicyArguments andon Legal Principles[NalYes] to IndicateFormalism

C

1948-79

1980-95

1996-07

2008-13

F
25.30***

(n=71 1)

(n=437)

0=451)

(Var30)

0.91

0.89***

0.74

(n7487)
0.79***

Does the decision use the

(0.29)

(0.32)

(0.44)

(0.41)

(Var3 1)

0.93*

0.87*

0.73

0.68***

Does the decision present

(0.26)

(0.34)

(0.45)

(0.47)

(Var32)

0.83

0.78***

0.63

0.64***

Does the decision refer to

(0.38)

(0.41)

(0.48)

(0.48)

(Var33)

0.88

0.85***

0.65

0.64***

Is the decision presented as

(0.33)

(0.35)

(0.48)

(0.48)

words

"purpose" of the

relevant statute? [No]
53.70***

principles such as equality,
freedom,

security

inferred

from

as
legal

texts? [No]
29.10***

the balancing of principles
and/or rights? [No]
52.00***

founded on the fulfillment
of social purposes, social
policy considerations? [No]
*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<03c0fl
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Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations of Formalism of Impersonality over Time
D. Impersonality (use

offst-person expresswon) [olye] to indicateformalism

(Var34)
Does the decision
explicitly mention personal
reflection and
deliberation-e.g. "I
think," "I believe," "in my
opinion"? [No]
*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001

E.

1948-79
(n=71 1)
0.45***
(0.50)

1980-95
(n=437)
0.51
(0.50)

1996-07
(n=451)
0.59
(0.49)

2008-13
(n=487)
0.62***
(0.49)

F
14.80***

Reference to Discretionand Choice

Despite the fact that judicial discretion is an integral part of the
decision-making process, the formalist notion of the mechanical
application of legal rules does not leave room for expressions of doubt on
the part of the judge or the acknowledgement of discretion in arriving at
his/her ruling. Following this argument, we expected to find an increase
in judges' references to discretion and choice during the periods when
formalism was said to decline in Israeli decision writing. Our findings
demonstrate that judges rarely express doubts or difficulties in the process
of decision-making. Nonetheless, we found a minor, yet statistically
significant, decline in formalism on this variable during the years 19962007.100 While before the mid-nineties about 95% of all opinions reflect
no difficulties in reaching a verdict, in 1996-2007, the percentages
dropped to 90%.101 A similar pattern was found for references to
discretion: Until the mid-nineties, about 70% of judges' opinions did not
mention discretion, whereas, during the third period, the figure dropped
to 60% indicating a less formalistic configuration. 1 02 In the most recent
period, formalism rose again to 68% of the opinions in 2008-2013 (see
the graphic representation of these trends in Figure 2 ).103 Overall, it
appears that judges refer to discretion in decision-making in at least 27%
of their opinions, while they acknowledge difficulty in deciding the case
in up to 10% of their writing. 10 4 Apparently, even a formalistic approach
can accommodate a limited suggestion of judicial discretion.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Table 6.
infra Table 6.
infra Table 6.
infra Figure 2.
infra Table 6.
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Table 6: Means and Standard Deviations of Formalism in Reference to Discretion and Choice over
Time
E. Reference to discretion and choice [no/yes] to indicateformalism
1948-79
1980-95
1996-07
(n=71 1)
(n=437)
(n=451)
(Var35)
0.94
0.95***
0.90
Is there reference to the
(0.23)
(0.21)
(0.30)
difficulty in deciding the
case? [No]
(Var36)
Is the decision presented as
a product of discretion or as
the product of legal/logical
reasoning and/or necessity?
[legal/logical/necessity]

0.69
(0.46)

0.73***
(0.44)

0.60*
(0.49)

2008-13
(n=487)
0.93
(0.26)

F

0.68
(0.47)

6.30***

4.35**

*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001
Figure 2. Reference to Discretion and Choice
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6

--

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1948-1979
-

F.

1980-1995
(var35) Difficulty

1996-2007
- - ---

2008-2013

(var36) Discretion

The Relationship Between Facts and Norms

The formalist emphasis on the facts of the case as separate from norm
application led us to expect that there would be a more explicit separation
between facts and norms during the periods that have been portrayed as
undergoing a decline in formalism. Contrary to our expectations, we
found that there was a clear increase in the focus on facts associated with
formalism over time: 80% of all opinions before the 1980s include a
description of the facts of the case, compared to almost 90% between 1980
and 2007 and 85% in the most recent period.105 In order to determine
whether decisions that refer to facts in a formalistic manner continue in
105. See infra Table 7.
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this vein on other features as well, we examined whether the description
of the facts included non-formalistic elements, such as reference to the
emotions of the parties. However, those cases that reported the facts of the
case continued using the formalistic option, and more than 90% did not
mention the emotions of the parties across all periods of time. 10 6
Another indication of the formalism of decisions is the distinction
between legal and other facts. Although judges rarely made a distinction
between legal and other facts (84% to 93%), they were more likely to do
so in recent years (15%) than in the early periods (only 7% in the
eighties).107 Thus, while generally, the increased focus on facts indicates
a move toward formalism, the reference to different types of facts
indicates that other non-formalistic elements have emerged in recent
years.

106. See infra Table 7.
107. See infra Table 7.
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Table 7: Means and Standard Deviations of Formalism in the Relationship Between Facts and Norms
over Time
F. The Relationship Between Facts andNorms [No/Yes] to IndicateFormalism
1948-79
1980-95
2008-13
1996-07
(n=71 1)
(n-437)
(n-45 1)
(n-487)
(Var37)
Does the decision include a
description of the facts of
the case? [Yes]
If "yes" for Var37, then;
(Var38)
Does the judge's
description of the facts of
the case include a
description of the feelings,
attitudes, emotions of the
parties? [No]

F

0.80**
(0.40)

0.88
(0.33)

0.87
(0.33)

0.88***
(0.33)

8.06***

0.94
(0.24)

0.94
(0.25)

0.90
(0.30)

0.92

1.97

(0.27)

(Var39)
Does the decision include a
reference to the facts as
presented by previous or
other opinions? [Yes]

0.31***
(0.47)

0.19***
(0.39)

0.36
(0.48)

0.31
(0.46)

N
(Var4O)
Does the judge make a
distinction between legal
truth and factual truth
(legal facts and social/
other facts)? [No]

565
0.90
(0.29)

383
0.93***
(0.25)

393
0.84
(0.37)

428
0.85*
(0.50)

N

642

324

262

285

9.50***

9.65***

*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001

G.

ProfessionalJudicialRhetoric

Mautner's concept of the decline in formalism in judicial writing in
Israel, that has become part of the taken-for-granted view of most legal
scholars,' 8 also includes a perception of the loosening of professional
language and an increased tendency to create legal writing that could be
accessible to the wider Israeli public.' 0 9 Again, contrary to our
expectations, our findings confirm the formalistic nature of professional
legal writing.

108.

See MAUTNER, supra note 11, at 90-95.

109.

See id.
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Table 8: Means and Standard Deviations of Formalism Addressing Professional Judicial Rhetoric
Norms over Time
G. ProfessionalJudicialRhetoric [No/Yes] to Indicate Formalism
1996-07
1980-95
1948-79
(n=45 1)
(n=437)
(n=71 1)
0.99
0.99
0.99
(Var4l)
(0.09)
(0.08)
(0.10)
Does the decision include
events from the judges'
own personal experience?
[No]

2008-13
(n=487)
0.99
(0.06)

F
0.46

(Var42)
Does the decision include
references to literature, art,
popular culture, poetry,
humor etc.? [No]

1.00
(0.04)

0.99
(0.10)

0.98
(0.13)

0.98*
(0.14)

4.04**

(Var43)
Does the decision include
slang or popular idioms?
[No]

0.81***
(0.39)

0.68***
(0.47)

0.81
(0.39)

0.80
(0.40)

11.10***

(Var44)
Is the language of the
decision self-consciously
literary, i.e., stylistically
contrary to ordinary legal
writing? [No]

0.95
(0.22)

0.97*
(0.16)

0.93
(0.25)

0.92
(0.27)

5.17**

*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001

In all time periods, over 90% of the decisions did not include
references to the judges' own personal experience, did not include
references to popular culture or artistic expression, and did not use
10
language that was contrary to the conventional professional legal genre.'
The only deviation from this trend was the appearance of slang or popular
expressions in about 20% of the decisions in most of the periods, with a
slight rise to about 30% during 1980-1995."1 It is difficult to explain why
there was less formalism on this variable than the others on this parameter.
We suggest that contrary to the other variables, the use of which would
mark the decision as unprofessional or non-legal, the inclusion of popular
idioms in the decision can increase its comprehensibility without affecting
its standing as a legal document.
H. InstitutionalBoundaries
We expected that judges would be most activist during the tenure of
Barak as Chief Justice, and that this would be reflected in an increased
110.
111.

See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss4/2

26

Alberstein et al.: Between Formalism and Discretion: Measuring Trends in Supreme Cou

BETWEEN FORMALISM AND DISCRETION

2019]1

1129

tendency for judicial intervention in other institutions and legal rhetoric
that ignores institutional boundaries. Table 9 indicates that in about 60%
of judicial opinions in 1948, there was no intervention in the activities of
other institutions. 11 2 However, over time opinions became more
formalistic, so that by the most recent period, more than 80% of the
decisions did not interfere with other institutions.' 13 Of those opinions in
which judges intervened in the operation of other institutions (644 over
all time periods), the vast majority (88%) interfered with professional
courts and lower instances, with 11% interventions in the administrative
branch, and 1% in the operation of the legislative branch (not shown in
Table 9).114 The fact that the majority of interventions were in the context
of the Court's traditional supervisory role may be related to other factors
in addition to an increase of formalism. One reason that over time the
Israeli Supreme Court was increasingly likely to maintain institutional
boundaries may be interpreted in the context of the development of
Israel's administrative institutions. Over time, the Court appears willing
to rely on the judgments of other institutions, and thus is less likely to
intervene in their decisions.
Table 9: Means and Standard Deviations of Formalism in the Maintenance of Institutional Boundaries
over Time
H. InstitutionalBoundaries[No/Yes] to Indicate Formalism

1948-79
(n=711)

1980-95
(n=437)

1996-07
(n=451)

2008-13
(n=487)

F
28.90***

(Var45)

0.57***

0.70

0.74

0.81***

Does the court intervene
in the decision/operation

(0.49)

(0.46)

(0.44)

(0.39)

of other institutions?

[Nol
*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001

L

Rationalismand the Inner Logic ofLegal Spheres

Judges tend to maintain a conservative approach to current legal
norms and practices, at least in terms of calling attention to any departure
from traditional procedures. In all time periods, judges mentioned they
were departing from practice or writing an innovative decision in less than
2% of the opinions.' 5 In other words, in their writing judges exclusively
rationalize their decisions within the inner logic of the legal sphere.

112.
113.
114.
115.

See infra Table 9.
SeeinfraTable9.
Data is file with the authors.
See infra Table 10.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 2

1130

[Vol. 47:1103

HOFSTRA IAW REVIEW

Table 10: Means and Standard Deviations of Formalism in the Rationalism and the Inner Logic of the
Legal Sphere over Time
I. Rationalism and the inner logic of legal spheres [no/yes] to indicateformalism
F
2008-13
1996-07
1980-95
1948-79
(n=487)
(n=451)
(n=437)
(n=71 1)
(Var48)
Does the decision mention
that it is a departure from
current legal norms and
practice? [No]

0.99
(0.08)

1.00*
(0.05)

0.98
(0.15)

0.99
(0.10)

3.32*

(Var49)
Does the decision mention
that it is an innovative or
boundary-breaking
decision? /No]

1.00
(0.05)

1.00*
(0.05)

0.98**
(0.13)

1.00
(0.05)

4.85**

*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001

J.

The Gap between "Law in the Books" and "Law in Action"

In accordance with formalist legal rhetoric, judges are unconcerned
with the application of their decisions, taking for granted the convergence
of social reality with legal opinions.' 16 A move away from formalism
would be found in references to the application of the norm. We found
high levels of formalism on all three items in this construct. 1 7 Judges
addressed the difficulties of implementing their decisions or ways of
overcoming these difficulties in less than 10% of the opinions,' 1 and thus
they appeared to take for granted that there was no gap between their
decision and reality. In only a few more cases, 10% to 14%, were judges
slightly less formalistic and delegated the implementation of their
decision to other parties or institutions.11 9 What is interesting is that the
third period- 1996-2007-as the least formalistic of the four time frames,
and on two variables (the difficulty of implementation, and ways of
overcoming these difficulties) was significantly, if only slightly lower,
than the previous period.1 20 It is tempting to attribute this finding to the
tenure of Justice Barak as Chief Justice during this period.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
See infra Table 11.
See infra Table 11.
See infra Table 11.
See infra Table 11.
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Table 11: Means and Standard Deviations of Formalism in the Gap between "Law in the Books" and
"Law in Action" over Time
J. The Gap between "Law in the Books" and "Law in Action"
[no/yes] to indicateformalism

(Var50)
Does the decision refer to
the difficulty of the
implementation? [No]
(Var51)
Is the decision forwarded
to other institutions for
implementation? [No]

1948-79
(n-711)
0.98
(0.15)

1980-95
(n=437)
0.98*
(0.15)

1996-07
(n=451)
0.94
(0.23)

2008-13
(n=487)
0.95
(0.21)

F

0.88
(0.32)

0.89
(0.31)

0.86
(0.34)

0.90
(0.31)

0.85

0.98***
(0.15)

0.91
(0.28)

0.93***
(0.25)

9.44***

0.97
(Var52)
(0.18)
Does the decision mention
ways of overcoming
hurdles that might prevent
implementation? [Nol
*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001

IV.

4.47**

DISCUSSION

Although law students who study hard cases are often exposed to
creative and anti-formalist modes of decision-making, we found that in
Israel, when using a representative sample of routine legal opinions,
formalism is the prevailing mode of legal rhetoric. Legal rhetoric does not
rely on extra-legal arguments (Var28),121 does not include references to
art or popular culture (Var42), 12 2 does not refer to the emotions of parties
in describing the facts of a case (Var38), 12 3 and does not address the
difficulties of applying legal norms (Var50).124 These anti-formalist forms
of legal rhetoric rarely appeared in our analysis over the entire time period
(see Figure 3a).
Notwithstanding this high level of formalism, our data reveal
patterns of both increase and decline over time on other aspects of
25
formalism. We present these trends in Figure 3b.1 In terms of the
increase in formalism, judges tend to use fewer personal expressions as
their rhetoric becomes more professional (Var34),126 and, surprisingly, are
less likely to intervene in the decisions of other institutions (Var45). 127

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See supra Table
See supra Table
See supra Table
See supra Table
See infra Figure
See infra Figure
See infra Figure

1.
1.
1.
1.
3b.
3b.
3b.
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one-quarter of the judges included references to policy and social
purposes when writing their decisions.132 Is this a sign of the decline of
formalism? Can claims about the decline of formalism be justified by this
finding? We would like to suggest a different interpretation that is
consistent with the theoretical development of this parameter in legal
literature. We find that while the trend to greater policy and principles
rhetoric reflects a decline of one type of formalism, at the same time it
points to the emergence of a new phase that can be defined as formalistic
in a different sense. The use of policy arguments or legal principles
reflects a particular reconstruction of the critique of formalism in
reference to the indeterminacy of legal rules as promoted by Legal
Realism. 13 3 It introduces an instrumental perspective to legal decisionmaking that may be regarded as domesticating the Legal Realist critique
while developing new legal rhetoric. 134 Some have already suggested that
the introduction of policy and principles do not reflect an anti-formalist
perspective, but view it, instead, as a more developed stage of
formalism.135 Ernest Weinrib adopted this new version of formalism and
celebrated it as the true representation of the inherent qualities of law.1 3 6
According to Weinrib, "immanent moral rationality" is what formalism
offers the law, and such a quality is central to any understanding of the
functions and importance of law. 137 Weinrib regards formalism in this new
phase as the law's aspiration to be clean of politics, values, ideology, and
emotions. 13 8 Using policy arguments and purposive language thus keeps
judicial writing within the realm of law. Our research suggests that legal
writing reflects the emergence of a formalism described by Weinrib, 139
which we term Stage II Formalism.
Stage II Formalism is also evident in the reference to discretion and
choice, which as we found also increased over time, indicating a decline
of formalism.1 40 We can see that the decline in formalism appears
particularly when we look at judges' tendency to acknowledge the very
132.

See supra Table 4.

133.

Frank, supra note 18, at 208.

134.
(1988).

Garry Peller, Neutral Principlesin the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 608-09, 617

135.

Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudenceof Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

583, 548, 592 (1993).
136.

Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.

949, 953-57 (1988).
137. Id. at 950-57.
138. For a critical view of the use of policies and purposes as only pretending to escape politics
and external arguments, see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT 77-79 (1986). "Formalism in this context is a commitment to, and therefore also a belief
in the possibility of, a method of legal justification that contrasts with open-ended disputes about the

basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, or visionary." Id.
139.

See supra Figure 3.

140.

See supra Table 6.
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fact that they have discretion. The concept of judicial discretion has
undergone various transformations in legal literature, moving from a
perception of unbounded authority, such as Weber's Khadi-justice,4 m
which decisions are influenced by a range of legal, moral, political, and
emotional considerations1 4 2 to weaker notions of discretion, such as the
one defined by Dworkin. 14 3 Recent writers assume that "[t]he thesis of
judicial discretion does not claim that in cases where discretion may be
exercised anything goes."l4 4 Such cases are governed by laws "which rule
out certain decisions."l4 5 While acknowledging the dangers of absolute
discretion, 14 contemporary judges perceive structured discretion and
reasoned elaboration as important aspects of their role. 14 7 It seems that
Israeli justices feel that acknowledging discretion and choice in their
opinions does not challenge the legitimacy of the formal decision. 14 8 In
other words, judges' references to discretion reflect a perception of legal
decision-making that does not equate discretion with an escape outside
the boundaries of law. Indeed, the fact that from the earliest period,
discretion was mentioned in about one-quarter of the decisions 4 9 seems
to indicate that it was also legitimate to a more limited extent in rulegoverned formalism.
When examining the various trends of formalism, it is apparent that
formalism does not decline significantly on all its dimensions. On the
contrary, many forms of formalism remain stable and high, while others
increase over time. However, even on those parameters in which
formalism remained high, there was often a slight decline in the period of
1996-2007 (variables 29, 40, 48, 49, 50, 52),15o that coincides with
Barak's tenure as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel. Thus, on
141.
142.

MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 13, at 227-29.
Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, andLaw: Child Custody and UMDA's Best-Interest

Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2226-27, 2248 (1991).
143.

DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 125; Dworkin, supra note 35, at 628, 634-35;

Ronald Dworkin, No RightAnswer, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1978). Jurisprudential writing has dealt
with discretion in relation to hard cases. The most famous debate was between H.L.A. Hart and
Ronald Dworkin, who disagreed about whether judges had discretion in the strong or weak sense in
hard cases. HART, supra note 15, at 272-76; Dworkin, supranote 35, at 626-27. Dworkin's "one right
answer" thesis has been challenged by HART, supra note 15, at 272-76 and others (see, for example,
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 58-59, 72-74 (1979)). They
assume that not every legal question has a right answer, and in difficult cases at least two alternative
decisions are possible. See HART, supra note 15, at 147-48; RAZ, supra, at 58-59, 73-77.

144.
145.

Joseph Raz, Legal Principlesand the Limits ofLaw, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 843 (1972).
Id.

146.

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 12-14, 27

(1969).
147.

G. Edward White, The Evolution ofReasoned Elaboration:JurisprudentialCriticism and

Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV 279, 291-98 (1973).
148.

See MAUTNER, supra note 11, at 57-67.

149. See supra Table 6.
150. See supra Tables 3, 7, 9 & 11.
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some indicators, despite the very formalistic nature ofjudicial writing, the
trend was in line with those who spoke of a decline in formalism.15
It is compelling to ask, in light of our surprising finding about legal
impersonality and impartiality, whether judges seek to maintain a balance
in the use of different elements of formalism. For example, do judges
balance a decline in formalism at the policy level, with an increased
formality in professional rhetoric? Do judges balance their emphasis on
discretion with a growing frame of formalism in the introduction? Do
judges use more personal language when rule-based formalism is their
style? It may be suggested that the formalist ship of law sails safely when
one or two tenets are declining, but it cannot release itself altogether from
all formalistic bonds.
What our research has not resolved, and what can be viewed as a
limitation of this study, is the question of what weight should be assigned
to each measure of formalism. Claims against formalism have developed
at different stages of legal history, and some of the characteristics
attributed to formalism have become more popular and familiar, and
therefore more significant in classifying legal decisions as formal or not.
It seems that Mautner's depiction of the decline of formalism in Israeli
judicial decisions is based largely on three features: the insertion of liberal
political ideas into law, the rise of purposive interpretation and policy
discourse, and the increased acknowledgment of judicial discretion.152
Our findings support the decline of formalism on the last two
parameters.15 3

Nonetheless, other parameters, such as the use of impersonal
language associated with an objective detached perception of law, the
preservation of institutional boundaries, and the legalistic framing of the
text of decisions, have always been considered distinctive traits of a
functioning, formal legal system. On these, we did not find the expected
decline over time, and at this stage we can only suggest that there is a
possible interplay between the various features of formalism, so that
judges do not completely diverge from the formalistic mold.
In this study, we viewed formalism as a complex multidimensional
phenomenon, and thus we did not seek to determine the relative
importance of its various components. Now that there is a clearer
empirical picture of the trends of each parameter of legal formalism in
Israeli legal rhetoric, the floor is open for various interpretations about the
relative weight of each measure.

151. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
152.

Mautner, supra note 11, at 90-95.

153. See supra Tables 4 & 6.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This Article examined the extent to which critical claims about the
formalism of law are implemented in the legal rhetoric of Israeli Supreme
Court decisions. Our findings suggest that, on most measures, there was
little evidence of the much-debated decline in formalism.154 However, the
rise in the reference to judicial discretion and the incorporation of policy
goals as a basis for decision-making do follow the expected change in
judicial rhetoric. We argue that these findings may indicate a
reconstructed genre of formalism, which we termed Stage H
Formalism."s Thus, although legal rhetoric adheres to the "Stage I
Formalism," i.e., the aspects traditionally associated with formalism, on
most measures, it seems that the deviations and decline discussed in the
literature can, in fact, reflect a reconstruction of formalism that
incorporates policy and discretion into the formal legal realm. In other
words, Legal Realism and other critical schools have not replaced
formalism but have changed it in significant ways.
This research presents the findings of a four-year empirical study that
sought to examine the extent to which claims about the decline in
formalism were evident in legal writing in routine cases. Like other
research that relies on content analysis, it provides a way of systematically
and objectively analyzing legal phenomena in a large number of opinions.
Thus, unlike other work that has studied anti-formalistic trends mainly in
relation to a small number of "hard" or "precedential" cases, our analysis
encompasses a large number of routine cases decided by the Supreme
Court. However, as others have noted, research based on content analysis
cannot provide the deeper understanding of individual opinions that
comes from traditional interpretive techniques.15 6 Moreover, the main aim
of this study was to determine whether the features that have been said to
indicate formalism in legal opinions do indeed act in a similar way and to
trace the trajectory over time of each of these elements of formalism.157
We acknowledge that there are many case characteristics that may also
potentially influence the formalism of legal opinions, and we anticipate
conducting further research to identify patterns of formalism among, for
example, the different fields of law represented in the data (criminal cases,
public law, and civil cases) and between hard cases (frequently quoted in
other cases) and routine cases. Future research could also analyze the
relationship of the parameters of formalism to other independent variables
such as the number of opinions quoted, the length of decisions, and the
154. See supra Parts III-IV.
155.

See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.

156.
157.

Hall & Wright, supra note 64, at 99.
See supra Parts I.B, II.
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particular judges who wrote the decisions. It would thus be possible to
provide profiles of Supreme Court justices in relation to formalism.
Understanding the formalisms of law is important in order to
understand law in action. Contrary to current notions of formalism, our
research demonstrates that it is not so much the case that formalism exists
or not, but that there is an intricate interplay between the various aspects
of formalism. Legal texts today, and even in the past, reflect both the
aspiration for formalism, as well as its deviations, and judges may attempt
to balance these in their opinions. The fluctuating paths of legal rhetoric
are therefore neither completely in the direction of formalism or away
from it but reflect the trends in social and jurisprudential development in
negotiation with formalistic aspirations.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss4/2

36

